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Abstract 
This study primary target is to examine the effects of aid on fiscal responses in Sub-Saharan Africa. The 
significant of capital accumulation for economic development and growth was broadly recognized long time ago. 
However, most developing nations- particularly Sub-Saharan African nations, are still trapped in ‘vicious circle 
of poverty’ and have failed to fund most of the desired level of investment from their own domestic savings. 
Previous studies of development debated that these nations would come out of stagnation only if they received 
support from developed countries (Rodan 1961, and Chenery and Strout 1966). Based on this observation donors 
from developed countries are concerned about how their aid is been used in various recipient countries, 
especially how it affects the fiscal responses by the receiving countries government. Aid may be given to 
governments; but the effectiveness will hinge on their fiscal behavior from diverse recipient government. The 
preponderance evidence from theoretical and empirical literature on the effectiveness of aid proposes that 
external finance has not had a remarkable influence on development in most Sub-Saharan Africa nations. 
However, there are certain evidences that aid has had certain major impacts on growth in most favorable policy 
environments. 
 
This survey reviews the current proof on the effects of external finance on government tax and expenditure effort 
in diverse receiving nations-especially in Sub-Saharan Africa, ending with a discussion of when budget support 
is a fiscally effective aid modality. Severe data shortcomings restrict inferences on the association between 
expenditure and aid, particular as most regimes are not aware of all the available aid to fund the provision of 
public goods. Three generalities are allowed by the proof: aid fund government expenditure; the degree to which 
external finance is fungible is over-stated and even where it is fungible this does not seem to make the external 
finance less effective; and there is no systematic effect of aid on tax effort. Beyond these conclusions the fiscal 
effect of external finance are nation-specific. 
Keywords: Aid, Fiscal response, fungibility, Government expenditure, taxation 
 
1.0 Introduction  
Sub-Saharan African1 (SSA) countries have been classified among those recipients’ countries who have been 
receiving hundreds of billions of dollars of foreign aid since the creation of post-war financial system at Bretton 
Woods (Moyo and Ferguson, 2010). Most of the aid flow to Sub-Saharan Africa countries represent significant 
inflows of money, particularly as it concern poorer Sub-Saharan Africa countries. According to Glennie (2008) 
suggestion, such aid has had double purpose: the first purpose is to look into the short-term humanitarian need 
and to create long-term strength in the social and economic institutions of Sub-Saharan Africa countries.  
Sub-Saharan Africa continues to present important challenges to the international donors’ community. There was 
a significant reduction in aid in 1990s; partly for the reason that donors argued that aid was not successfully 
attaining the anticipated objectives (Lancaster, 2007). For example, these donors were frustrated based on the 
fact that they noticed that there was no correlation between the strengthening of social and economic institutions 
and foreign aid in Sub-Saharan African (Fengler and Kharas, 2010). Even though most donors noticed this, they 
have not stopped pouring aid to Sub-Saharan Africa. In recent years, several nations like Sweden and other 
European economies in particular, have started becoming bigger foreign aid donors to the region (Robinson, 
2011). India and China, with their significant position in the world economy today, have also increased their 
interest in the region as prominent donors to the region (Noman, Botchwey and Stein, 2012). There have been a 
serious and continuous augment in the academic community creating the case for and against the effectiveness of 
aid in Sub-Saharan Africa with two broad divisions emerging: on one side consist of commentators who argued 
that foreign aid is helpful and on the other side comprises of scholars who argued that the aid that is been 
channeled to recipient countries bring about inefficiencies and so has failed to meet up with the expectation and 
objectives of “institution-strengthening” (Van Deer Veen, 2011).  Particularly, the anti-foreign aid arguments is 
that the inflow of aid money feeds an incompetent bureaucracy, and is siphoned off by corruption and creates 
distortion in the markets which tend to prevent recipient nations from creating rational and resilient institutions 
of their own (Mavrotas, 2010). Additionally, most aid that are given to Sub-Saharan Africa countries are not 
effective because most recipient governments implement “pocket policy” a policy that is design to benefit 
                                                 
1
 Sub-Saharan Africa: The United Nations defines Sub-Saharan Africa as every country in Africa but Algeria, Egypt, Libya, 
Morocco, South Sudan, Sudan, Tunisia and Western Sahara; that is as every African country that is not a part of Arab 
Northern Africa (United Nations, 2011). 
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those in power and not the general public (Ehizuelen Michael, 2014). Aid has to be allocated to those countries 
pursuing good policies and not those countries pursuing “pocket policies”, to a larger extent; it is argued, than is 
already the case. 
On the other hand, the argument of the pro-foreign aid is that, despite the fact that foreign aid might be misused 
in several ways, it makes the recipient nations better off than they would have been without it (Lehman, 2011). 
Recently, analysts have used statistical and empirical models to test pro-foreign and anti-foreign aid arguments 
(Palmer and Morgan, 2011). Economic development is the fundamental problem of nearly all countries and 
capital accumulation is a focal point of economic growth - particularly in less developed nations. Even though 
the significant of capital accumulation was recognized long ago (check Lewis 1954, Harrod 1939 and Domar 
1946), less developed nations have usually failed to fund the desired level of investment out of their personal 
resources (i.e. savings). This situation called for external finance as an optimal means to break out from the 
‘vicious circle of poverty’ experienced by these poor nations and fasten the reform procedures. The purpose of 
this study is to theoretically and empirically survey the influence of foreign aid inflows on ‘recipient 
governments’ revenue collection and expenditure behaviors with evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa. 
The organization of this paper follows this order: The first section deals with the introduction of the paper. The 
second section looks at the theoretical and empirical literature review of aid effectiveness and their fiscal 
responses. The third section deals with aid and government expenditure. The fourth section will be concentrating 
on the fungibility and sector expenditure. The fifth section will look at aid and public expenditure. The sixth 
section will cover the fiscal effects of aid, fiscal response as well as aid and taxation. The seventh section will 
conclude the paper.  
 
2.0 Literature Review of Aid Effectiveness: Theoretical and Empirical Evidence 
For many years now there has been enormous outburst of studies on the effectiveness of aid and their fiscal 
response, much of this research has been dominated by both empirical and theoretical examination. The topic has 
been a central and recurring subject with which several economists, subscribing to different paradigms of 
development thinking, have grappled. Questions like whether aid works or not has been approached from diverse 
ideological and methodological perspectives. In the next section we will be able to look at some of the 
theoretical and empirical literatures on aid effectiveness. The theoretical foundation for the empirics started from 
the two-gap model of Chenery and Bruno (1962) and Chenery and Strout (1966): developing nations have 
deficient level of domestic savings to fund diverse level of investment essential to attain a desired rate of 
economic development, and limited foreign exchange reserves to acquire imported capital goods. These foreign 
exchange and savings gaps constraint growth, and foreign aid can be one vital instrument donors can use to help 
various recipient countries fill these gaps.  
2.1Theoretical Literature 
 
The literature review in this paper proposes that experts from varying theoretical orientations (Bangura, 2000; 
Hudson, 2005; Moyo and Ferguson, 2010; Silberfein, 2004) agree that foreign aid to Sub-Saharan African has 
been ineffective but there is little consensus on why the aid has been ineffective or how the ineffectiveness can 
be quantified. There was a seminal study that was conducted by Brautigam and Knack (2004) on the correlation 
between aid and the quality of governmental institutions in Sub-Saharan Africa. Both of them found out that 
there was a significant negative correlation between the various variables of government quality and foreign aid 
to Sub-Saharan Africa. This discovery was highly significant for the reason that it proposes that the correlation 
between aid and social indicators or between aid and economic indicators is strongly moderated by the quality of 
government. Despite the fact that most of the empirical studies on aid-growth relation produced some 
contradictory results, early development model supported the idea that foreign aid promotes growth in 
beneficiary nations by supplementing little domestic savings and easing foreign exchange shortage. Looking on 
the fiscal response however, there were no such well-developed theories, which forecast the influence of foreign 
aid inflow on recipient government’s revenue collection, spending and borrowing behavior. Based on the 
revenue part, aid may possibly upsurge government tax collection efforts particularly when the aid is tied to 
certain project and the government obligation will be to mobilize domestic resources to cover part of the cost of 
the project. The domestic resources in relation to aid could chiefly come if there is an increase in domestic 
taxation. Most papers that have been written on fiscal response, however, hypothesized that financial inflow may 
lessen the government’s tax collection effort (Griffin and Enos, 1970, Heller, 1975 and Mosley et al., 1987). This 
observation can be seen particularly in a system that has weak regime with weak institutional set up. This may 
possibly have the tendency of shrinking their tax collection efforts most particularly when they have access to 
acquire certain foreign resource like grant (Griffin and Enos, 1970), for the reason that foreign resources are seen 
as an addition for the government when it comes to funding its expenditures.  
Based on this situation, foreign resources are driving domestic resources down whose result is anticipated to 
retard growth (Griffin and Enos 1970, Weisskoff, 1972). According to Rodan argument (1961), the author thinks 
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that domestic efforts have being the principal element in the transition. This implies that if inflows of foreign 
resources create a disincentive-like effect in decreasing the effort of collecting tax by the government, it rather 
turn out to be inimical to growth. This is the reason why most research works that observed aid decreasing 
domestic savings argue that aid retards growth (Griffin, 1970, Weisskoff, 1972). According to World Bank 
(1998) argument, when aid reduces tax, it misguided policies, encourages corruption, creates incompetence 
within the government of that receiving country and later hinders growth. Looking at that part of expenditure, 
you will notice that aid certainly upsurges government spending for the clear reason that it upsurges the 
availability of resources that assist government in funding its expenditures supposing the fall in tax does not 
offset the inflow of aid. On the other hand, the kind of expenditure, which upsurges aid flow, may possibly be 
dissimilar from nation to nation. There is an assumption that most regimes in the beneficiary nations regularly 
employ the available resource in funding consumption like military expenditure, increasing salary of civil 
servant etc. (Heller, 1975). Others may possibly employ their available resources to fund developmental projects 
like dams, irrigation schemes construction etc. (Gang and Khan, 1991). The growth outcome of foreign resources 
when employed for developmental issues is clearly dissimilar, for the reason that the results of foreign resources 
rely on how it is employed and its influence on most régime tax revenue. A debate is still going on as to whether 
decrease in tax and upsurge in consumption rather than investment has low growth payoff. 
 
Numerous research studies have shown that the effects of diverse kinds of aid on both expenditures and revenues 
of government of recipient nation differ. The assumption is that grants may possibly be channel to consumption 
while loans tend to be used in productive areas of capital expenditures. The dissimilarity is that the first one is 
not paid while the latter one is paid back indicating the presence of incentive problem. The assumptions stated 
above are built on diverse hypothesis about the behavior of the government in the receiving nation. Thus, it will 
be an empirical issue to examine which one of the above assumptions is valid. One of the early model in the 
fiscal response literature was the Heller’s (1975) model, which was generally employed in the literature area 
(See evidence from, Gupta et al., 2003; Franco-Rodriguez et al.,1998; Alemayehu, 1996, 2002; Otim, 1996; 
Khan, 1998; Khan and Hoshino, 1992; Gang and Khan, 1991; Mosley et al.,1987 and White, 1993, 1994. 
 
According to Heller (1975) specification, the recipient policymaker’s utility function which is express in linear-
quadratic form is written in deviation of the actual aim values of the choice variables (expenditures and 
government revenues). The utility function make best use of subject to funding constraints, which was 
disaggregated into two, where the accounting identity as well as the total receipts was equal to the total 
expenditures, this assumption holds. The utility function specified exhibits diminishing marginal utility and it 
upsurges with spending and drops with domestic resources. (Re-construct this statement). Despite the fact that 
government attempt to minimize the deviations from the target values, it is symmetric for the reason that the 
government placed the same weight to overshooting and undershooting of the choice variables involved. Even 
though Heller’s model was seen as the first and employed as the starting point for the rising literature in the area 
of fiscal response, there were attempts from various scholars, which modified the theoretical settings by 
adjusting certain hypothesis that was applied by Heller (1975) and some other authors like Mosley et al., 1987; 
White, 1994; Gang and Khan, 1999; Khan 1998 and Franco-Rodriguez et al., 1998.  Furthermore, to some 
modifications of the Heller model, it was seen that Mosley et al. (1987) stretched the fiscal response analysis a 
step forward to examine the overall influence of overseas capital on output growth that goes via public and 
private investment. Therefore, the private function was specified in such a way that it captures the effect of aid 
that runs through change in price. On the other hand, output was specified as a function of private and public 
capital stock so that the indirect effect of aid that runs through public and private investment is captured. 
 
Even though Gang and Khan (1991) adopted the Heller’s model specification in their latter study that was 
conducted in 1999, (Gang and Khan, 1999) where they put forward an argument that the previous model 
specification by Heller was impractical as it assumes that government attached the same weights to over and 
undershooting the target variables. Therefore, both authors proposed a ‘quadratic-ratio loss function’ rather than 
in deviation form. Looking at both situation (the previous model specification in ‘linear-quadratic function in 
deviation form’ and the latter ‘quadraticratio’) it was now assumed that policymaker’s attempts to minimize the 
deviation from target values but over and undershooting were differently weighted. The second specification, 
which is the ‘quadratic-ratio function’ established by Gang and Khan (1999) permit them to estimate the fiscal 
response of diverse kinds of policymakers who are not the same by the weight they attach to over and 
undershooting of target values of diverse choice variables ( check Gang and Khan, 1999 and Khan, 1998). 
Lastly, there was some selection among the policymakers employing Akaike information criteria and personal 
observation. To examine the fiscal response behavior of three Southeast Asian nations Khan (1998) also applied 
similar technique. It was a different side of the story from Franco-Rodriguez et al. (1998). They treated aid as an 
endogenous variable in the quadratic utility function specification. In contrast to previous examinations, Franco-
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Rodriguez et al. (1998) made mentioned of domestic borrowing as one instrument for funding consumption 
expenditures, which was previously restricted by other authors as an instrument for funding investment. In the 
budget constraint, these authors applied the system of inequalities, which is to some extent not the same from 
previous surveys. 
 
2.2 Empirical Literature 
 
Let’s look at the empirical literature by considering the empirical study of Heller’s (1975) who considered the 
influence of diverse kinds of aid (loan, grant, bilateral and multilateral) on numerous categories of public 
expenditure (socio-economic consumption in the public sector, public spending for developmental purposes and 
civil consumption in public sector.), domestic borrowing and government revenue. According to Heller (1975) 
examination, the author employed data from eleven African nations categorized as French and English speaking. 
The author concluded that aid upsurges both consumption and government investment and reduce domestic 
borrowing and taxes. It upsurges total government spending for the reason that aid flows upsurges the 
availability of resource for funding government expenditures.  By way of decomposing aid into loan and grant, 
Heller (1975) noticed that grant has a stronger and bias pro-consumption whereas concessional loan has stronger 
bias pro-investment. For that reason, grant indirectly contributes to private consumption by reducing taxes and 
directly augmented public consumption. He was able to estimate the equation by pooling cross-section and time 
series data. According to Heller (1975) Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) estimation surveys results, the author 
found that both samples (English and French speaking) government investment takes about 63-76 percent of 
total loans in contrast to about 41-53 percent of official grant, displaying that the debate about loan having a bias 
pro-investment and grant having a bias pro-consumption is true. The fact that Heller (1975) observes loan to be 
more pro-investment bias and grant to be more pro-consumption bias fortify the uncertainty that diverse kinds of 
aid have dissimilar macroeconomic consequences. The empirical study by Levy (1997) also revealed that there is 
dissimilarity in utilization of expected and unexpected aid. The outcome from the estimation of consumption 
function of various sample nations revealed that unexpected aid is completely consumed but over 40 percent of 
expected aid is invested. 
 
The influence of foreign aid influx on growth was not explicitly captured in Heller’s model. This was picked up 
by Mosley et al. (1987) where Heller’s model was extended and the influence of aid on output growth was 
assessed. According to Heller’s original model, the target level of public investment was assumed as a function 
of lagged output and private investment. On the other hand, Mosley et al. (1987) states that the private 
investment is extended to include price effects (by way of dividing it into tradable and non-tradable sectors) of 
financial inflows and secondly, output was further redefined as an aggregate production function of government 
and private capital and labor.  Mosley et al (1987) empirical results from both cross sectional and time series 
data displays that aid does not have a demonstrable influence on the economic development of most receiving 
nations in the 1960’s and 1970’s.  Based on Heller’s (1975) model, two other authors namely, Gang and Khan’s 
(1991) empirically investigate the fiscal response of the Indian government to foreign financial inflows by 
employing time series data. These authors proposed a two-step technique, to enable them examine the correlation 
between aid and growth. The first step focuses on the fiscal responses aspect of foreign aid while the other step 
deals with the influence of public investment and consumption on developmental variables such as growth and 
income distribution (Gang and Khan, 1991). Even though they applied the framework developed by Heller 
(1975), they were able to come up with estimation employing the non-linear three-stage least square (3SLS) 
estimation procedure. In actual fact, both Gang and Khan (1991) results confirm Heller’s original findings on the 
tax side but contradict other earlier findings on the part of expenditure. The parameters that display the 
proportion of tax revenues, loan and grant spent on recurrent spending (Gc and Gs) are 1.08, -0.79 and -0.03 
respectively.  
 
Knowing that the last two parameters were insignificant indicate that aid does not statistically influence 
government consumption but all tax revenues are used for funding consumption. The empirical results of Gang 
and Khan (1991) which states that aid (both loans and grants) are employed for funding investment is dissimilar 
from the results of Heller (1975) which stated that about 63-73 percent of the total loans and about 41-53 percent 
of official grants goes to public investment. Contrary to the results of Heller, there is no statistically dissimilarity 
between the two sources of aid (talking about bilateral and multilateral) their findings indicates that bilateral aid 
pulls resources out of government consumption while multilateral aid is employed for funding both consumption 
and investment expenditure. Other authors like Binh and McGillivray (1993) as well as White (1994) criticized 
the work of Gang and Khan (1991) based on theoretical and methodological aspects. White argument was based 
on the fact that Gang and Khan (1991) assumption about how aid had been employed for investment in Indian 
was a misinterpretation of their findings. The author concern was that the way Gang and Khan generated their 
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target values were not only inconsistent with budget constraint but also will not be significant when R2 from the 
regression is close to one or zero. Since such generated values cannot be good proxy variables for target values, 
set up by policymakers, based on economic growth objectives, the above critic put forward by White applies to 
all the studies that followed similar methodology.  
 
There was another examination by Gang and Khan in 1999 to see whether different source of aid have dissimilar 
influence on government revenues and spending and the general fiscal behavior of Indian government employing 
slightly dissimilar method (asymmetric quadratic ratio utility function). The findings from their empirical study 
point out that just like previous study; bilateral aid is employed for funding investment than multilateral aid. This 
specification permitted them to estimate the equations for diverse kinds of policymakers1 from which Gang and 
Khan (1999) selected non-developmental, fiscal conservative and non-statist based on Akaike’s information 
criteria. According to Gang and Khan (1999) observation, they realized that about 40 percent of domestic 
revenue, about 83 percent of bilateral aid and about 91 percent of multilateral aid was employed for funding 
consumption (non-developmental) expenditures. The implication is that foreign aid is chiefly employed to fund 
non-developmental expenditures, which is contrary to Gang and Khan (1991) work from which both of them 
concluded that aid to India is directed to investment. Nevertheless, with regard to the influence of bilateral and 
multilateral aid, both Gang and Khan (1991) have been able to replicate their results by saying that bilateral aid 
finances developmental projects more than the multilateral aid.  As a final point, both authors concluded that the 
observed movement from bilateral to multilateral aid in India is not desirable, for the reason that resource from 
multilateral sources tend to fund consumption instead of investment. 
 
The same technique was applied by Khan (1998) (asymmetric quadratic-ratio policymakers utility function) and 
was later employed by Gang and Khan (1999) to empirically look at the macroeconomic influence of aid in three 
Southeast Asian nations; Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia. Created on the ground of Akaike’s information 
criteria, the policymakers concluded that Indonesia was developmental, statist and fiscal liberal. According to a 
survey conducted by Khan, the author noticed that 50 percent of domestic revenue, 33 percent of bilateral aid 
and 54 percent of multilateral aid were channel to non-developmental expenditure respectively.  The findings of 
Khan’s (1998), as compared to Gang and Khan (1996), demonstrated the superiority of bilateral aid over 
multilateral aid because of the above reason. The final point of Khan studies concluded that similar results hold 
for both Malaysia and Thailand respectively. Both Khan and Hoshino (1992) also examined the fiscal response 
of recipient governments to foreign aid inflows by using five nations from South and Southeast Asia as example 
and by adopting the Heller (1975) model specification. Both authors applied the technique of nonlinear three-
stage least square (3SLS) estimation procedure which displays that aid influence taxation, investment and 
consumption, this result was not dissimilar from Heller (1975) conclusion. Related to Heller’s (1975) results, the 
parameters that shows the proportion of tax revenue, grants and loans spent on recurrent expenditures (Gc and 
Gs) were 0.88, 0.48 and -0.21 respectively. This implies that tax is used for funding consumption while 
relatively grants are more pro-consumption and loans tend to pull non-loans resources from recurrent 
consumption to investment. The influences of loans and grants on tax efforts displays that  
grant have the tendency of reducing taxation while loans have the tendency of increasing taxation for the reason 
that policymakers in most receiving nations applied non-repayable money (grants) to cut tax burden (Khan and 
Hoshino, 1992).  
 
That is the reason most poor nations tax collections have economic cost and political resistance (Heller, 1975 
and Otim, 1996). Both Khan and Hoshino (1992) did not discover any differences between bilateral and 
multilateral aid in influencing investment. Both Khan and Hoshino findings were questioned by McGillivray due 
to the fact that critical hypothesis test and analysis making explicit the direct and indirect effects of aid in the 
model were missing. The author further argues that the parameters for the share of loans and grants assigned to 
consumption were statistically insignificant.  This indicates that Khan and Hoshino (1992) conclusion that aid 
influences both investment and consumption and investment further pull resources away from consumption was 
                                                 
1
 Gang and Khan (1999), and Khan (1998) estimated loss function for different ‘type’ of policymakers’ who 
differ on the weight they attach to over-or undershooting the target level of the three choice variables; 
domestic revenues (R), developmental expenditures (D) and non-developmental expenditures (N). 
‘Developmentalist’ gives more weight to undershooting developmental expenditure target than overshooting. 
The opposite being ‘Non-Developmentalist” ‘Fiscal liberal’ gives more weight to overshooting revenue target 
than undershooting. The opposite is ‘Fiscal conservative’ ‘Statist’ gives more weight to undershooting non-
developmental expenditure target than undershooting. The opposite is ‘Non-statist’. By taking different 
combinations of this, they have estimated loss function for eight types of policymakers. Note that their objective 
function is minimization of the loss function. 
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not correct. McGillivray believes that if the indirect effects of aid are involved in the model then the influence of 
aid will be to lessen consumption and upsurge investments (McGillivray 1994). On the other hand, White (1993) 
also tested the influence of aid on government revenue and expenditures by involving feedback effects via higher 
income. Implicitly, White assumption was based on the fact that aid boosts growth as anticipated by previous 
development theories, which negate the results of Griffin (1970) and Weisskoff (1972). Furthermore, White 
(1993) argued that the study by Mosley et al (1987), which considered the influence of aid on growth via 
changes in fiscal behavior of the beneficiary government and price, did not look into the dynamic and multiplier 
aspects. By ways of including these effects, White (1993) displayed that there is a possibility that aid inflows 
upsurges taxes supposing it is channel into private investment. 
 
On the other hand, Otim (1996) also try to examine the fiscal behavior of three South Asian nations by applying 
the Heller (1975) model. Most of the results of Otim (1996) confirm the findings of Heller (1975), as well as 
Khan and Hoshino (1992) where they stated that loans are pro-investment and grants are pro-consumption (based 
on the fact that Otim got 18.7 percent of loans and 34.4 percent of grants finance consumption expenditures). 
However, the findings that inflow of aid upsurges recipient nation’s tax collection effort and the availability of 
aid tax help to pull resources out of consumption contrasts with previous findings. There was another noticeable 
observation from Otim study, the author did not believe that multilateral aid is more productive that bilateral aid, 
so he thinks this fact contradicts with the findings of Heller (1975), Khan and Hoshino (1992) who concluded 
that there is no dissimilarity between the two findings, and Gang and Khan (1991, 1996) and Khan (1998) who 
came up with a conclusion that bilateral aid is more productive. To sum up this discussion on empirics of fiscal 
response, let us deliberate on the subsequent table and briefly discuss the key outcomes and policy implications 
of fiscal response literature. The subsequent table shows the estimated values of parameters, which measure the 
proportion of domestic revenue (interpreted as tax) (E1), grants (E2) and loans (E3) allocated to consumption 
(recurrent) expenditures respectively. 
 
Table 1: The summary results of some previous empirical studies 
 Heller (1975) 
Pooled 
Sample 
Gang and 
Khan (1991) 
[for India] 
Khan and 
Hoshino 
(1992) 
Pooled 
sample 
Otim (1996)  
Pooled 
Sample 
Gang and 
Khan (1996) 
[ for India] 
Franco-Rodriguez 
et al (1998) 
[for Pakistan] 
ρ1 0.83 1.08 0.88 -0.371 0.4563 0.85 
ρ2 0.38 -0.79 0.48 0.344 0.8323 0.51 
ρ3 -0.39 -0.03 -0.21 0.187 0.9153 0.54 
 
Note:  
 Based on the findings of Gang and Khan (1996), E2 and E3 present the proportion of bilateral and 
multilateral aid allocated to consumption spending.  
 On the other hand, based on the findings of Franco-Rodriguez et al (1998), E2 and E3 present the 
proportion of foreign aid (loans plus grants) as well as domestic borrowing allocated to consumption 
spending 
 
The table above shows certain mixed result of various authors, but certain general skeptical conclusions could be 
drawn out from it. Based on that we can see that the parameter which measure the proportion of tax allocated to 
consumption got positive value, which is nearer to one concept from Otim (1996) indicating that domestic 
revenue is chiefly employed to fund consumption expenditures. The proportional range of their findings was 
from 45 percent for Gang and Khan (1996) to 100 percent for Gang and Khan (1991). Several surveys also point 
out that loans were more pro-investment than grants as the government in the receiving nations tends to employ 
loans (on which repayment is expected) wisely than grants, which were free resources. The outcome was 
intuitive as loan has incentive element to use it resourcefully than free resources grant. Based on this fact, the 
policy implication is that donors should provide loans rather than grants to promote growth in developing 
nations. If this is the situation, there is a cost attached to it particularly when the resources are employed to fund 
consumption and inefficient investment projects from which repayment at complete scale is not anticipated. This 
create a rising problem of debt crunch from which most less developed nations are suffering from today. With 
this issue, the fiscal burden of debt accumulation may offset the private influence and discourages private 
investment. 
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3.0 Aid and Government Expenditure 
Numerous surveys on external finance and government expenditure in most recipient countries-especially Sub-
Saharan Africa center on fungibility, i.e. weather aid is spent by donor on the intended purpose or not. Actually, 
this was one of the exact emphases by the World Bank (1998) where fungibility was interpreted as the diversion 
of aid away from its intended purpose for investment and development, this issue was offered as a factor for 
restraining aid effectiveness in promoting development in Sub-Saharan Africa countries. However, most of the 
literature on aid effectiveness in Sub-Saharan Africa center on whether aid is fungible offers little analysis of the 
effect on the total expenditure. According to a study conducted by McGillivray and Morrissey (2004), these 
authors came up with three significant distinctions --- sector fungibility, additionality and general fungibility. 
Their investigation was center on whether  aid in general was fungible; on the consumption that aid is anticipated 
to fund public investment, the question asked is how much of the external finance is ‘diverted’ to fund 
government consumption expenditure under the supposition that such diversion lessens the effectiveness of aid 
(e.g. World Bank, 1998). This is confusing as government consumption comprises of expenditures to maintain 
and operate investment projects; public investment expenditure is mostly construction costs (for instance, 
building a hospital), while the essential recurrent costs for productive investment (for instance wages for doctors, 
nurses and medicines) are contained within as consumption. Therefore, Sub-Saharan Africa governments should 
see consumption (or recurrent) spending is a vital complement to investment and should be seen as human 
capital investment. In this case, the argument that fungibility lessens the effectiveness of aid is commonly 
misguided (McGillivary and Morrissey, 2000) 
Even though most Sub-Saharan Africa countries spend the aid on the intended sector (i.e. not fungible) which 
may possibly create a complete addition, but in real sense does the government spending on the sector upsurge 
completely by the amount of aid received? There was a study that was carried out by McGillivary and Morrissey 
(2001), these authors demonstrate that additionality is hard to establish, which may possibly be one motive for 
the dearth of empirical proof (McGillivray and Morrissey 2004). For instance, givers of aid could make sure the 
aid is spent as envisioned by undertaking the spending themselves, such as building hospital, school and good 
road via a donor project. However, the receiving countries may possibly answer back by decreasing the amount 
of its personal resources (domestic revenue or tax) allocated to spending in that sector, as a result, sector 
spending  does not upsurge completely by the amount of the aid (sometime it may not upsurge at all). It is as 
well likely that sector spending upsurges by more than the aid; even though certain sector aid is fungible (let's 
say a donor builds a hospital that produces a claim on future government recurrent expenditure). These concerns 
are addressed in some fiscal effects studies of aid that address wider effects of aid as well as the dynamics of the 
fiscal association; even though aid in a specific year is not completely allocated as givers intended, expenditure 
in the areas favoured by givers may possibly upsurge over time by at least the amount of aid.  
4.0 Fungibility and Sector Expenditure 
According to the survey done by McGillivray and Morrissey (2004), both authors discuss the limitations 
associated with the literature on aid fungibility. To begin with, the underlying theoretical model posits two 
distinct kinds of spending sector, one to which aid is distributed and another to which aid is not allocated, and 
that these are divisible in the government’s utility function so that only fungible aid affects the expenditure 
allocation (Feyzioglu et al. 1998:34) Therefore, the model does not permit aid to affect expenditure distribution 
across all sector. Secondly, there is also the problem of lack of appropriate data to estimate the model as one 
must be familiar with how much aid the donors anticipated to spend on each expenditure sector. Thirdly, the 
econometric methods employed in most surveys are assume to be lacking the components of government 
expenditure which are determined independently (assuming that they are divisible); in reality the components are 
together determined and this should be permitted for in the estimation. Fourthly, which is the most significant; 
no effort is made to permit for the dynamics of the wider fiscal effects of aid, on borrowing, the evaluation of 
spending on specific sectors and taxation. Both the second and third issue will be addressed in the fiscal response 
part below.   
The drawback explains the reason why most of the examinations provide such mixed proof of the influence of 
aid on expenditure: in some circumstances total expenditure upsurges by more (or falls by less) than non-
developmental expenditure. Certain unwarranted end have been drawn, notably that fungibility ‘assist clarify 
why large amounts of aid had no long-term effect in highly distorted settings’ (World Bank, 1998:82) The 
ineffectiveness of Aid can be possible as a result of low productivity of public spending or aid-funded 
investment as to aid being channel to unintended purposes. Numerous surveys find that even where aid is 
fungible this does not seems to lessen the effectiveness. Both McGillivray and Morrissey (2000) argued that 
fungibility simply reflects the actuality that donors and receiving countries have dissimilar preferences 
concerning the allocation of public expenditure. Receiving countries want aid to be maintained as well as 
recognize givers’ wishes for policy and expenditure allocation, even though these vary from what the receiving 
countries consider suitable. Based on this, the spending allocation result will be somewhere between the two 
preferences, relying on respective bargaining powers and the ability of recipients to efficiently implement 
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spending strategies. In further analysis, McGillivray and Morrissey (2001) argue that the fungibility issue is 
confusing; so the relevant matter is how aid affects dynamic fiscal behavior and how undecided strategies are 
executed. Both authors propose ‘aid illusion’ such that the officials executing spending strategies misperceive 
the purposes of the policy officials and donors who set spending strategies. The necessary fact for such 
misperception to arise is not there, because the public expenditure management system and information flows 
are weak. These authors studies show that even though the receiving nations intend to employ aid in a fungible 
way the outcome may not be that spending on the items donors want to support will upsurge by less than the 
value of the aid. The authors also demonstrate situations of unintended fungibility of the appearance of 
fungibility (for the reason that only spending allocations rather than the budgetary process are witnessed). 
However, the fungibility examination may possibly be informative concerning the influence of aid on the 
composition of government expenditure, at least in the short-term. This issue can be considering in the context of 
current surveys by assessing the effect of aid on sector expenditure.  
Current fungibility examination consider if aid to a specific sector is actually spent on that sector. For instance, if 
the donor intention for given aid was to solve the educational or health problem but later diverted to other 
unintended purpose, then the intended purpose is not actualized. This is the reason why most analysts are 
concern and asking what is actually happening to the aid that is been sent to these recipient countries? The 
problem this study is facing on this topic is in constructing sufficient data on sector aid. Based on this fact, the 
basic source is the aid statistics and the Creditor Reporting System (CRS) delivered by the Development 
Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD on sector aid for giver-receiver pairs. On the other hand, Pettersson 
(2007) delivers a comprehensive examination of sector aid fungibility employing two sectors, social and other, 
assuming that total aid disbursement can be distributed to sectors according to the sector allocation 
commitments.  Other authors like Wagstaff (2011) reaches the same conclusion by examining two health 
projects in Vietnam: the sector (i.e. health) aid seems to be fungible but this does not noticeably lessen the 
influence of the projects. In the author analysis, he emphasis that there may even be fungibility within projects or 
sectors; for example van de Walle and Mu (2007) noticed that certain aid that was intended to fund road building 
in one province seemed to support roads building in another province in Vietnam. The implication is that 
fungbility may possibly be existing but need not lessen the effectiveness of aid. Even though these authors do not 
address if aid is fungible, authors like Michaelowa and Weber notice certain weak proof that aid to the 
educational sector is related with augmented primary school enrolment and completion rates; this shows that 
there is an element of effectiveness even if it is fungible. 
5.0 Aid and Public Expenditure 
Surprisingly, it may seem that there is very little specific proof for the effect of aid on expenditure. This can be 
possible for the reason that present surveys focused on diverse questions: fungibility examination center on 
where the aid is channel to while fiscal response surveys consider the wider fiscal association. Where the latter 
do comprise of the effect of aid on expenditure, it is usually positive though seldom completely additional (not 
for the reason that aid is fungible, although it may possibly be, but for the reason that aid supports reductions in 
borrowing---- more emphasis below). According to Remmer (2004), the author specifically addressed the eff
 ect of external finance on government expenditure with cross-country data over the period of 1970-
1999, in the framework of the literature on growth of government size (which is measured as government 
spending/GDP ratio) and notice that aid is an important determinant of spending/GDP growth in the middle and 
low income nations. Even though the examination is econometrically accomplished, as the focus is on the effect 
of aid on long-run adjustments in spending/GDP in a model containing determinants of government size, there 
are drawbacks. To start with, the author analysis does not completely permit for the fact that aid itself is 
contained within government expenditure that is to say accounting terms is a significant part of aid provided to a 
nation which is included in the measure of government expenditure (the examination should attempt to permit 
for this ‘double counting’). Secondly, aid may possibly affect or even be part of (in accounting measurement 
terms) certain other explanatory variables, like import/GDP and tax/GDP ratios, and these inter-related effects 
are not permitted for. On the other hand, the examination establishes the anticipated effect of aid on total 
expenditure for a period of time. 
In a study conducted by Morressey et al. (2011), they analyse the effect of aid on expenditure for an unbalanced 
panel of annual data for fifty-eight nations between the period of 1990-2008; nearly all the nations has certain 
missing annual observations (particularly on government revenue and spending), and certain nations has data for 
sub-period like the 1990s or 2000s only. For the complete sample (fifty-eight nations), on average total 
expenditure is similar to the amount of aid and tax revenue but it is notably less than by summing the total aid 
and revenue. This issue can be clarified by observing the donor aid, measure by overstating what is received by 
the receiving regime, even if it is also possible that total revenue may possibly consist of elements not significant 
to the measure of government expenditure (let's say the local government revenue or taxes related with publicly 
owned businesses). For the complete sample over the whole period average government expenditure has been 
reliably between 22-27 percent of GDP, with a small but obvious upward trend (most especially since the early 
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2000s). The tax revenue as a percentage of GDP was reliable at 15 percent on average until the late 2000s (it 
augmented to nearly 20 percent by 2008). Most of the spending on health and education are quite low and 
education is more than twice the level of health spending on average (14.5 percent and 6 percent of total 
expenditure on average).  Aid is a percentage of receiving countries GDP for there have been a huge decline 
from an average of eight percent over the 1990s to about six percent after 2002. Looking at the measure of aid, it 
is equal to 30 percent of total expenditure on average, but as with other variables there is considerable 
variability, across nations and for some period of time  (with a significant drop, from over 35 percent at the 
beginning to less than 25 percent by the end). Relatively, richer developing nations get less aid, typically much 
less, than poor nations; for fourteen of fifty-eight nations, aid is less than five percent of government expenditure 
in (nearly) all years and for an additional eight it fell below five percent in the 2000s. 
6.0 Fiscal Effects of Aid 
The dearth of fungibility approach to the effect of external finance on expenditure is that it does not permit for 
wider fiscal influences of aid for a period of time, particularly on revenue, borrowing  and tax. In addition, 
obvious concern with fungibility may possibly serve to distract attention away from the more fundamental 
subject of how external finance influences on receiving countries fiscal response in general, together with the 
interaction of  revenue and spending variables. Most Studies that examine the fiscal effects of aid addresses the 
components of the budget by bearing in mind the correlation between government spending, (and sometimes 
borrowing), aid, and domestic revenue (taxes). 
6.1 Fiscal Response 
In an examination from Lloyd et al. (2009), they applied a general country-specific fiscal response study to a 
sample of 19 nations. Their key finding was that aid is an important element of the fiscal association for variety 
of developing nations (comprising of numerous middle income nations for which aid is a relatively small share 
of expenditure), that is to say they confirm that aid does impact budgetary behavior. For most recipient nations, 
aid is weakly exogenous (that is to say, donors do not answer back to fiscal imbalances in determining their 
allocation, but aid has effects on the other fiscal variables) and is positively related with expenditure (both 
recurrent and capital). However, these authors did not elaborate on the effect of aid on expenditure, that is to say 
they do not deliver any estimates of the magnitude of the effect of aid on expenditure, nor do the authors provide 
estimates of the degree of the effect of aid on expenditure, nor do Lloyd et al. (2009), also provide any 
conversation of the effect of aid on the composition of dynamic of government expenditure. 
Numerous surveys has be conducted on the fiscal effects of aid, but even though these display that the effect 
differ on consumption (recurrent) as likened to investment expenditure, in this case, few estimate the degree of 
the effects on total expenditure. There was an early applications of fiscal models (FRMs) that was conducted by 
McGillivray and Morrissey (2004) where they employed the structural  econometric (3SLS) estimation 
techniques and notice numerous limitations: the authors realized that they are notoriously hard to estimate and 
very sensitive to (and demanding of) the data, often producing inconsistent estimates of core parameters; it is 
essential to estimate budget targets but there is no accepted theory concerning how governments form spending 
and revenue targets; the theoretical context does not deliver a good picture of government behavior (and is not 
directly derived from a utility optimizing context); and the behavioural association being estimated is assumed 
fixed over time (that is to say, the models do not permit for dynamics).  
In other to address these drawbacks as well as estimating the FRMs, there were certain surveys that were 
undertaken in respect to series of econometric techniques that have two exact benefits in this context. To start 
with , having established the fiscal aggregates (borrowing, spending and revenue) which is exhibited by a long 
run equilibrium (cointegrating) association (and that aid is part of this) the data can then be permitted to estimate 
which of the variables drive the association and how the variables answer back to each other; it is essential to 
impose a structural relationship and how the variables respond to each other; it is not necessary to impose a 
structural association or estimate targets. Secondly, the technique allows a distinction in estimating the long run 
(equilibrium) and short run (change to the equilibrium) associations between the variables, comprising of aid. 
The initial survey to adopt this approach was Osei et al. (2005) for Ghana; these authors demonstrates how the 
fiscal response and fungibility approaches can produce contradictory interferences and show that the fiscal 
response is more trustworthy. Particularly, they display that the external finance to Ghana from the 1980s was 
connected with reduced domestic borrowing (for the reason that reducing domestic borrowing was a requirement 
imposed by the IMF) and augmented tax revenue (for the reason that reforms in the cocoa sector promoted by 
the World Bank).1 Furthermore, as borrowing is more closely associated with investment expenditure, while tax 
revenue is distributed to recurrent expenditure, recurrent expenditure rose more than investment expenditure 
following the upsurges in aid. This proposes prima facie that external finance was fungible (investment 
expenditure rose by less than the aid and by less than recurrent expenditure) but it is actually for the reason that 
                                                 
1
 It is not the amount of aid that generates effects on borrowing or tax revenue but specific policies (that were implemented) 
associated with the aid, i.e. the effects can be interpreted as due to conditionality rather than the aid itself. 
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the aid was employed to lessen borrowing. Therefore, even though the econometric study displays that aid did 
not directly determine spending growth, the upsurge in aid joined with the increasing tax revenue allowed 
expenditure to increase whereas borrowing was reduced. As a result, aid facilitated improved fiscal management 
even if it seemed fungible. 
Another author Ouattara (2006) obtains the same outcome for Senegal (employing a structural FRM rather than 
time series method): the author feels that aid had no significant effect on total expenditure but did cut borrowing. 
Even though it is not explicitly specified it is likely that multilateral donors (the IMF) required drops in 
borrowing as a quid pro quo for augmented aid so that the aid could not (all) be employed to support 
expenditure. Notably, fungibility surveys omit controls for borrowing and revenue and assume that the aid that is 
given is intended to fund specific expenditures; this may possibly lead to incorrect inferences on whether 
external finance is fungible. Ghana and Senegal situation display that donors linked aid to reducing borrowing so 
that additionality could not be achieved (in the case of Ghana, total expenditure augmented for the reason that 
tax revenue rose). More significantly, the study on FRM display that just looking at spending and aid can result 
in missing the big picture—expenditure decisions are made within a fiscal (budget) context in which external 
finance is only one component.  
In another investigation done by Morrissey et al. (2007), they extend the time series FRM method with official 
Kenyan data for 1964-2004 (that is to say, the aid was reported by the government, which is much less than 
declared by donors to Kenya), to differentiate the fiscal effects of loans and grants and consider the influence of 
aid on growth (within a fiscal context). The outcomes varied for the two kinds of aid: grants were linked with 
augmented expenditure and that government expenditure had a positive effect on growth (grants as well had a 
small positive relationship with growth); loans, however, were a response to unexpected deficits, that is to say if 
expenditure surpassed revenue (grants and tax) the government required loans to fund the deficit (in periods of 
budget surplus the loans were reimbursed). Hence, aid loans and fiscal deficits have a negative relationship with 
output. Another interesting outcome is that tax revenue was weakly exogenous, that is to say, the regime was not 
able to upsurge tax revenue in the short-term to change the budget disequilibrium (deficits). It follows that 
because grants and tax revenue were not amenable to short-term adjustment by the receiving government (in 
effect there were not policy tools), borrowing (loans) changed to expenditure disequilibrium. 
Looking at the current application of the time series method, Martins (2010) delivers a comprehensive 
examination of the fiscal effects of aid in Ethiopia by employing a unique quarterly data set for the period 1993-
2008. Contrary to the surveys of Kenya and Ghana, aid grants changes to the level of development expenditure, 
that is to say, donors to Ethiopia seems to delivers additional grants if development expenditure is upsurge. In 
addition, there is proof for a long run positive association between development expenditure and aid but not 
between recurrent spending and aid (hence no proof that aid is fungible). Based on other situation, domestic 
borrowing upsurges in response to shortages in revenue (grants and tax) and there is no proof of a long run 
fellowship between tax revenue and aid (that is to say no proof that aid affects tax effort). 
6.2 Aid and Taxation 
Addressing the aid and tax issue, it is necessary to know that within the research tradition on determinants of 
cross-country variations in tax/GDP ratios, where the ratio is fundamentally clarified by a tax structure equation 
(to proxy the tax base times the tax rate), the few surveys conducted including aid providing no solid proof that 
aid is a systematic determinant of tax ratios, that is to say no proof that aid has a behavioural effect on tax effort. 
Two authors Teera and Hudson (2004) carried out an investigation and discover that the coefficient on aid is 
trivial in their estimates of tax performance in developing nations. Most of the Empirical surveys of the fiscal 
effects of aid do not support the final result that aid lessens tax effort, but all these suggestions are country-
specific (Section 3.1). There are some current studies that provide certain proof that in the past 15-22 years low-
income aid receiving countries have managed to upsurge tax ratios; this positive relationship between tax and aid 
ratios proposes that in most aid receiving countries, the policies that is related with aid have supported the 
growing tax/GDP ratios (Clist and Morrissey, 2011). Furthermore, there is also some evidence that the 
connection between augmented tax ratios and aid may possibly be connected to the aspects of governance (Brun 
et al.2009). 
There is a specific concern that aid may possibly discourage tax effort, particularly if given a pure grant that 
creates no repayment obligations, but there is a little proof to this suggestion.  Based on Gupta et al. (2004) 
surveys, the authors find that aid grants have a negative effect on tax effort, but that loans are positively 
associated to tax revenue; the authors conclude that grant induce lower tax effort but loans encourage tax effort 
to meet repayments. In a study conducted for Kenya that differentiates grants and loans, Morrissey et al. (2007) 
discover no evidence for an effect of aid on tax effort. Actually, the general outcomes propose that Kenya has 
limited ability to alter tax revenue (more general arguments in Keen and Simone 2004). On the other hand, Cist 
and Morrissey (2011) address the effect of grants and aid loans on tax effort by employing data for eighty-two 
developing nations from 1970-2005 and discover no strong proof for a negative effect of aid grants on the 
tax/GDP ratio. The authors propose that one should expect a contemporaneous relationship for the reason that 
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most of the poorest nations have lower tax/GDP ratios, partly for this motive, these countries tend to receive 
additional aid in the form of grants. Permitting this with moderately long lags on aid (let’s say five years in a 
panel context) removes the aid effect. 
The authors also notice that aid loans have a fairly reliable positive influence, particularly in the medium-term. 
They further noticed that grants are trivial over the full period but positive and significant over the medium-term. 
Additionally, the significant negative short-term effect of contemporaneous grants over the entire period is 
reliable with most poor nations that have lower tax revenue, as well as nations that are receiving more grants; 
there was no effect like this between the periods of 1985-2005. The outcomes propose that external finance does 
assist nations to upsurge their tax revenue over the medium term. It may possibly be that the external finance is 
related with conditions involving measure to upsurge tax revenue, which could be taken to mean as a positive 
influence of conditionality. Most analysts believe that tax effort stand for a structural association, this make most 
authors to think that the tax/GDP ratio is determined by the tax rate which is applied to the tax base (which is 
aggregated over all taxes), given tax collection effectiveness. In fact, aid itself is not part of this structural 
association: aid may possibly have a behavioural effect (on rates, bases or collection effectiveness) or policies 
related with external finance (conditionality). In this effect, the controls involved the proxy for the tax base (such 
as industry and agriculture shares in the economy, imports, exports and GDP) which can partially capture the 
indirect behavioural or policy effects. 
It is more challenging to address the tax effect of policy reforms that is related with conditionality as there can be 
numerous effects in opposing direction. Certain policies that are related with external finance in most recipient 
countries tend to decrease tax revenue. This situation occurred for the reason that economic liberalization has 
been an element of conditional lending (aid upsurges) and such reform episodes are commonly related with tax 
revenue reductions. In a study conducted by Aizenman and Jinjarak (2006, 2009) both authors result shows that 
reforms like trade liberalization erode the revenue from ‘easy to collect’ taxes like tariffs (which tend to be very 
significant for poorer nations). Poor nations have difficulty in replacing the lost revenue via ‘hard to collect’ 
taxes, like VAT or income taxes, which require important investment in tax collection and resources for 
enforcement and monitoring, whereas the relatively small size of the formal sector implies a low tax base. 
Therefore, periods of economic policy reform in most developing nations tend to be related with decreases in the 
tax/GDP ratio, particularly for the poorest nations (Baunsgaard and Keen 2005), but most times they might as 
well tend to be related with aid episodes. In this manner, aid conditionality may really create a negative 
relationship between tax/GDP and aid/GDP ratios in the short-run. This assistance clarifies why one notices a 
negative association between tax and aid ratios, but it is not due to a behavioural effect of aid decreasing tax 
effort.  
In fact, it is the poorest nations (also likely to be the main aid receivers) that face the highest challenges in 
increasing tax revenue (Keen and Simone 2004; Teera and Hudson 2004), that is to say the low tax/GDP is due 
to features related with low income rather than implying low tax effort. Given the tax base these nations are 
gathering as much as can be anticipated. In an examination carried out by Mkandawire (2010), the author argues 
that the nature of their colonial experience established institutional features that continue to assist and clarify 
why certain African nations have higher tax revenue than others. Changing tax/GDP ratios is a sluggish 
procedure. Actually, certain policy conditions will have the purpose of increasing incomes (the tax base) and tax 
collection effectiveness, and maybe even increasing tax rates (like consumption taxes); these effects may 
possibly be observed over the medium-term, and there is proof to support this positive association since the mid-
1980s. 
 
7.0 Conclusion 
Even though the significant of capital accumulation for economic growth was broadly recognized long time ago, 
most developing nations- particularly Sub-Saharan African nations, are still trapped in ‘vicious circle of poverty’ 
and the region have failed to fund most of the desired level of investment from their own domestic savings. 
Previous models of development made known that these nations would come out of stagnation only if they 
received support from developed countries. Based on the two-gap model instituted by Chenery and Strout (1966) 
which displayed that these nations are constrained with little foreign exchange earnings and domestic savings. 
The prediction from the model states that external finance is an optimal means to break out from the ‘vicious 
circle of poverty’ and find ways to solve the two gaps issues simultaneously. Even though it seems convincing 
and interesting, most of the empirical examination on the effectiveness of aid came up with mixed outcomes. 
These mixed results made different experts to come up with diverse critics about the empirical study on the 
effectiveness of aid. The first critics to the ‘optimist’ view of 1950s and 1960s came from Griffin and Enos 
(1970). Both authors argued that aid rather contributes negatively to growth, as it is substituted for domestic 
saving by increasing consumption and decreasing government revenue collection effort. Following that 
observation, numerous empirical surveys were conducted on aid-growth relation but they were with inconclusive 
outcomes. The key problem with single equation based aid-growth or aid-saving/investment studies, is that it has 
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serious problems for the reason that they fail to recognize that aid is chiefly diverted via the public sector and its 
net effect relies on how it is employed in this sector and how this sector responds to the inflow of foreign aid.  
Various donors are concerned about how their aid is been employed in recipient countries, especially how it 
affects the fiscal behavior of the receiving regimes. Most of the analyses done on the fiscal effects of aid were 
motivated by the observation that most aid spent in any nation either goes via the budget or has an indirect effect 
on the budget by funding the provision of public goods and services. This paper examined the current evidence 
on the effects of aid on government expenditure and tax revenue as well as the fiscal response of the receiving 
governments to the inflow of foreign aid in Sub-Saharan African. There have been severe data limitations 
restricting the interferences on the association between expenditure and aid. Expenditure may not upsurge by the 
complete amount of aid, either for the reason that the aid is employed to lessens borrowing or is not actually 
reflected in the budget (that is to say, when making budget decisions the government is not aware of all the aid 
available to fund the provision of public goods). In other to assess the effects of aid on expenditure it is essential 
to survey the evolution of spending, in total and across specific sectors. Analysis like this is made known by 
fiscal response studies, displays that aid does not contribute to upsurges spending in total and in the sectors 
which are favored by donors. External finance affects the composition and evolution of government expenditure; 
this is supported by limited analysis of the cross-country effect of aid on expenditure. The few examinations that 
have been conducted on this matter specifically account for the effect of aid via which government expenditure 
discover positive aid effectiveness.  
According to Gomanee et al. (2005b) examinations, the authors display that aid-funding investment contributes 
immensely to growth in Sub-Saharan Africa, also, Gomanee et al. (2005a) display that the aid that fund 
government social sector expenditure contributes to the upsurge in aggregate welfare of the recipient countries 
(see Mosley et al., 2004). Furthermore, this literature indicates that the kind of aid and the sectors to which it is 
distributed to, rather than simply the amount of aid, determines the effect on government expenditure and hence 
the influence of aid. Aid funding has the right potential to leverage upsurge social expenditure (particularly 
sanitation, health and education) which produces benefits (Morrissey, 2010). Initially, social expenditure 
contributes to human development and funds the provision of public goods. On the second note, it is the kind of 
government spending most possible to upsurge aggregate welfare and benefit the poor. There are other 
components of external finance that can be targeted on investment to contribute to growth. Based on 
combination, external finance can assist complementary elements of expenditure to contribute to human 
development and growth, hence to sustainable poverty reduction. It is vital that donors’ aid policies for the future 
should be based on the most current proof, which is more encouraging that studies based on previous data. 
Numerous positive effect of external finance can be identified in areas of fiscal procedures, government 
expenditure and revenue mobilization. It is necessary for donors to avail themselves of these improvements in 
receiving countries systems so that it can help to provide aid in a more transparent way. If this transparency is 
put in place it will help to enhance the fiscal as well as the overall effectiveness of aid that is been channel to 
various recipient countries -- especially to Sub-Saharan Africa. Hence, in other for aid to be effective, the donor 
and recipient government will have to cooperate in a constructive way in the foreseeable future. 
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